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Efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science are impeded by lack of insight into 
how it varies in degree and in kind around the world. The current work investigates science 
skepticism in 24 countries (N = 5973). Results show that while some countries stand out as 
generally high or low in skepticism, predictors of science skepticism are relatively similar across 
countries. One notable effect was consistent across countries though stronger in WEIRD 
nations: General faith in science was predicted by spirituality, suggesting that it, more than 
religiosity, may be the ‘enemy’ of science acceptance. Climate change skepticism was mainly 
associated with political conservatism, especially in North America. Other findings were 
observed across WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations: Vaccine skepticism was associated with 
spirituality and scientific literacy, GM skepticism with scientific literacy, and evolution 
skepticism with religious orthodoxy. Levels of science skepticism are heterogeneous across 



















Science is an integral part of modern life. However, the historical authority of science can no 
longer be taken for granted1-3. Systematic and unwarranted rejection of science—i.e.,: science 
skepticism—has become a major societal problem that can have severely damaging effects on 
individuals and societies. To illustrate, two of the World Health Organization’s top 10 health 
threats for 2019 are firmly rooted in science skepticism: climate change and vaccine hesitancy. 
The latter is a particularly poignant example of the risks of science skepticism for public health, 
with insufficient vaccination rates leading to various measles outbreaks in 2017 and 2018 and 
documented increases in measles cases in various countries across the globe4. Vaccine 
hesitancy might also obstruct the probability of success of future public vaccination campaigns 
against Covid-1926,27.  
But are skepticism about climate change and vaccination shaped by the same causes? Recent 
work has shown that this is not so. Instead, evidence has started to accumulate for the 
“heterogeneity of science skepticism”1,2,5,6. This heterogeneity pertains both to the predictors 
of science skepticism and to the domains of science skepticism: Skepticism is shaped by varying 
beliefs and ideologies, and the effects of each is contingent on the domain (the most widely 
researched domains are climate change, vaccination, genetic modification, and evolution). For 
example, climate change skepticism is primarily associated with political ideology, but not with 
religious or spiritual beliefs, whereas vaccination skepticism shows the opposite pattern1,2,5. 
In addition to the relative importance of different predictors across different domains, a third 
potential strand of heterogeneity concerns potential cultural differences in science skepticism 
and its predictors. After all, a growing body of research shows that human beings are 
fundamentally a cultural species, so that many psychological differences (e.g., attitudes and 
beliefs) are rooted in cultural differences24. Importantly, to our knowledge, the limited evidence 
for the heterogeneity of science skepticism comes only from studies conducted in the US1,6 and 
the Netherlands2, which are both WEIRD countries (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
and Democratic7,8,24). Although other research9,10 has tested predictors of skepticism across 
countries, it has some important limitations, including being focused on one science domain 
only (i.e., vaccination9, climate change10), and excluding measures of belief which have been 
found to play a substantial role in shaping science skepticism (i.e., religiosity and 
spirituality)1,2,5,11. To obtain a more complete picture of the heterogeneous nature of science 
skepticism, it is crucial to test the broadest range of previously observed predictors across both 
WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations, and across multiple domains of science.  
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In sum, a systematic cross-national investigation of the relative impact of various potential 
predictors of science skepticism as manifested across domains is lacking. The main goal of the 
current research is to fill this gap and provide the foundation of a much-needed comprehensive 
research program that not only synthesizes previous work but also provides a crucial test of its 
generalizability across societies. In order to do so, we tested predictors of science skepticism 
about climate change, vaccination, genetic modification (GM), evolution, and general faith in 
science in 24 countries across the globe.   
The overarching hypothesis guiding the current research is that science skepticism is 
heterogeneous. We expect this heterogeneity to occur both within countries—such that 
different predictors are associated with science skepticism in different domains—but also 
between them, such that some patterns of association differ across countries. Based on 
previous work on the antecedents of science skepticism1,2,5,9,10 we additionally formulated a set 
of more specific hypotheses (see Table 1 for hypotheses), bearing in mind the caveat that 
previous research investigated these antecedents within a WEIRD (mostly Anglo-Saxon) cultural 
context. We did not formulate a priori hypotheses for predicting willingness to support science , 
because previous research yielded mixed results with some studies showing effects similar to 
those for faith in science - religious orthodoxy predicting science support in the USA, spirituality 
predicting science support in the Netherlands - and other studies only showing effects of faith 
in science on willingness to support science. Finally, we predicted several country-level 
differences. Hypothesis 1a is based on recent work on climate change attitudes and political 
ideology10. The remaining country-level differences that we hypothesized pertain specifically to 
potentially different effects of spirituality and traditional religiosity (operationalized as religious 
orthodoxy) in secularized Western (WEIRD) nations versus non-WEIRD nations—that have 
generally not undergone similar secularization processes—on science skepticism.  
Although we had access to community samples from roughly 12.5% of the worlds’ countries, 
we were able to cover all continents except Antarctica (see Figure 1), including various 
countries that are largely absent from the psychological science database8,24,30. The current 
research includes the following countries: Australia (N = 315), Belgium (N = 344), Brazil (N = 
236), Canada (N = 232), China (N = 169), Egypt (N = 247), France (N = 214), Germany (N = 269), 
Iran (N = 239), Israel (N = 247), Italy (N = 295), North Macedonia (N = 214), Mexico (N = 225), 
Morocco (N = 186), the Netherlands (N = 264), Poland (N = 244), Portugal (N = 252), Romania (N 
= 196), Sweden (N = 238), Tunisia (N = 228), Turkey (N = 320), United Kingdom (N = 357), United 
States (N = 254), Venezuela (N = 188). We used cultural distance from the United States as a 
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proxy for the WEIRDness of each country24. These values were available for 18 out of the 23 
countries (excluding the US) included in the research (see Table 2 and Table S2)i.   
 
Table 1 
Overview of hypotheses 
Main hypothesis 
 







Outcome variable Predictor(s)   
Climate change skepticism H1: Political conservatism1,2,10  H1a: Stronger effect in USA than 
in other countries10  
Vaccine skepticism H2: Spirituality and religious 
orthodoxy 1-2 
 H2a: Stronger effect of spirituality 
in WEIRD countries than in non-
WEIRD countries1-2 
 H3: Scientific literacy1-2  H2b: Stronger effect of orthodoxy 
in non-WEIRD countries than in 
WEIRD countries1-2 
GM skepticism H4: Scientific literacy1,2,12  - 
Evolution skepticism H5: Religious orthodoxy2,6  - 
Faith in science H6: Spirituality and religious 
orthodoxy1-2 
 H6a: Stronger effect of spirituality 
in WEIRD countries than in non-
WEIRD countries1-2 
   H6b: Stronger effect of orthodoxy 




Recruitment of participants. After obtaining approval for the study protocol by the Psychology 
Research Institute Ethics Committee at the first author’s institution (#2018-SP-8701), 
participants from community samples in 20 countries were recruited via Kieskompas Opinion 
Research (www.kieskompas.nl). The selection strategy included steps to optimize distribution in 
 
i Interestingly, cultural distance to US maps relatively well onto overall levels of scientific activity present in a 
nation23, operationalized by the size of a country’s R&D workforce per 1,000,000 residents (in 2012). Exceptions 
were Sweden (comparatively large cultural distance from USA, relatively large size of R&D workforce), Mexico and 
Brazil (comparatively small cultural distance from USA, relatively small size of R&D workforce)23. See Table S2 for 
the cultural distance and R&D values.  
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terms of the following demographics: age, gender, educational level, region. Participants from 
four additional countries were recruited via internet (e.g., email lists, social media; Brazil), 
research assistants (China and Romania), and Prolific Academic (UK). Our aim was to select at 
least 250 participants per country22. We managed to collect >95% complete responses from 
6904 individuals in 24 countries. Our only predetermined exclusion criterion was an attention 
check, which read “We would like to make sure that you are paying attention to the wording of 
the questions. Please fill in the number that corresponds to “somewhat disagree”. 905 
individuals (9.4%) failed the check and were excluded. An additional 23 participants were 
deleted because of a programming error, and 3 participants were deleted for indicating being 
younger than 18 years. This left us with a final sample of 5973 responses, with an average 
sample size of 249 per country, ranging from 169 (China) to 357 (UK). Their mean age was 40.9 
years (SD = 13.4). Gender distribution was 65.6% male and 34.4% female. An overview of 
demographics can be found in Table S2.  
Materials. The study consisted of the following measures. Unless otherwise reported, all items 
described below were scored on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Note that we did not expect all predictor variables to have an effect on the outcome variables; 
some were included primarily as controls, based on previous research. Upon completion of the 
study, participants were thanked for participation. The complete study materials can be found 
in Supplement 2.  
 Outcome variables  
Domain-specific science skepticism about climate change, vaccination, genetic 
modification (GM), and evolution was assessed with measures commonly used in previous 
work1,2,13 ii: “Human CO2 emissions cause climate change”; “Vaccinations cause autism”; 
“Genetic modification of foods is a safe and reliable technology”; “Human beings, as we know 
them today, developed from earlier species of animals”. All items except for the vaccination 
item were reverse-scored so that higher scores indicate more skepticism. General faith in 
science was measured with a 5-item scale1,2,14,15. An example item is “Science is the most 
 
ii Because of length constraints we used single item measures; these are well-validated and have been shown to 
produce similar results as multi-item measures1,2.  
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efficient means of attaining truth” (α = .84); full list of items can be found in Supplement 2. In 
line with previous research1-2, faith in science was held constant when predicting domain-
specific skepticism and willingness to support science (see Table 3). Willingness to support 
science was measured with the following item: “According to you, how much money should the 
government spend on science?”.1-2  
 Predictor variables 
 
 Political conservatism. Participants were asked to indicate how politically conservative 
they view themselves on a 10-point scale that ranged from 1 (very liberal) to 10 (very 
conservative)iii.  
 Religiosity. Participants indicated if they considered themselves to be religious (yes or 
no), and to indicate their religious affiliationiv. 
Religious orthodoxy. Religious orthodoxy was measured with two items (r = .66) taken 
from the orthodoxy subscale of the post-critical belief scale1,2,17: “Religion is the one thing that 
gives meaning to life in all its aspects” and “God has been defined for once and for all and 
therefore is immutable”.  
Spirituality. Participants were asked to indicate whether they considered themselves to 
be spiritual, using two items (r = .78) taken from previous research2,18. Note that this measure 
was not included for the Chinese samplev.  
 Scientific literacy. An 8-item test measuring science literacy was presented. Participants 
could score anywhere between 0 and 8 points. An example item is “Electrons are smaller than 
atoms” 1,19,20.  
 
iii Additionally, a second political orientation measure was included in the study, which asked participants where 
they would place themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (very left-wing) to 10 (very right-wing). Note that for the 
current purposes we were particularly interested in political conservatism as a predictor and the second measure 
was not included in the analyses (in line with previous research on science skepticism1,2,6,10). 
iv Participants also indicated their belief in God/higher power on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 
(very much). In line with previous research1,2, religious affiliation and belief in God/higher power were not included 
in the analyses (both in order to keep the amount of predictors limited and because these have been shown to not 
contribute variance over and beyond religiosity and religious orthodoxy).  
 we included religiosity and orthodoxy as predictors1,2.  
v Chinese participants were instead presented with a measure of materialism, being asked to indicate to what 
extent they, and others, consider themselves to be ‘materialist’. Materialism scores did not have any effects on the 
outcome variables, except for a small additional effect on GM skepticism.  
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Moral purity concerns. Participants completed the moral purity subscale of the moral 
judgments section of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire1,2,16, which consists of three items 
(e.g., “I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural”; α = .70). No other 
moral foundations were measured.  
 Perceived corruption of science. In line with previous research1,2, two statements were 
presented in which participants indicated to what extent they perceive science to be corrupted 
by governmental and corporate interference, respectively. These were included as two 
separate predictors in the analyses reported below21.  
Demographics 
Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, nationality, country of residence, 
years of formal education and scientific training, and subjective SES. Table S2 provides an 
overview of demographics.  
 
Results 
Our main goal was to test predictors of general faith in science and willingness to support 
science, as well as skepticism about four specific scientific domains: climate change, 
vaccination, GM, and evolution. To this end we conducted multilevel regression analyses for 
each outcome variable to examine the unique contribution of each predictor, while adjusting 
for country-level variation. We found no evidence for multicollinearity in the analyses (all 
Variance Inflation Factors < 2.1). Below, we report multilevel models for the various outcome 
variables, and then report the strength of the hypothesized effects per country. 
Descriptives. Table 2 displays means and standard deviations for each dependent variable 
across the 24 tested countries. Figure 1 presents a visual overview of science skepticism across 
countries. Both can be used to acquire a quick overview of how the various countries differ in 
skepticism, thus illustrating the observed similarities and differences across domains and 
countries.   
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Table 2  
Means and standard deviations of science skepticism, faith in science, and science support across countries 
Climate change skepticism Vaccine skepticism GM skepticism Evolution skepticism Faith in science Science support CFST US  
Country M SD Country M SD Country M SD Country M SD Country M SD Country M SD   
Total 2.45 1.77 Total 1.86 1.25 Total 4.57 1.75 Total 2.74 1.94 Total 4.60 1.47 Total 8.47 1.65   
Iran 3.50 2.00 Egypt 2.89 1.71 France 5.72 1.45 Egypt 5.77 2.15 Venezuela 3.52 1.35 UK 7.27 1.66 Egypt .234 
Venezuela 3.28 2.42 Romania 2.56 1.75 Romania 5.70 1.76 Morocco 5.31 2.49 Romania 4.03 1.43 Belgium 7.66 1.63 Tunisia    .156 
Romania 3.26 2.23 Morocco 2.36 1.56 Tunisia 5.45 1.84 Tunisia 4.89 2.61 China 4.17 1.15 Netherlands 7.72 1.63 China   .150 
China 3.10 1.80 Israel 2.30 1.62 Morocco 5.41 1.89 Romania 3.96 2.43 Mexico 4.29 1.52 France 7.81 1.77 Iran .150 
Belgium 2.91 1.86 Macedonia 2.28 1.66 Turkey 5.41 1.69 Israel 3.91 2.46 Brazil 4.30 1.46 Iran 7.85 1.91 Morocco .149 
Tunisia 2.71 2.16 Turkey 2.26 1.45 Venezuela 5.02 1.67 Venezuela 3.37 2.41 Egypt 4.34 1.34 Romania 7.86 2.10 Turkey .120 
Germany 2.61 1.59 Tunisia 2.20 1.60 Egypt 4.98 1.97 Mexico 2.93 2.36 Tunisia 4.34 1.48 Canada 7.97 1.93 Sweden .115 
UK 2.54 1.60 France 2.09 1.44 Macedonia 4.89 1.92 Turkey 2.85 2.43 Iran 4.35 1.62 Germany 7.97 1.84 Romania .103 
Poland 2.44 1.73 UK 2.08 1.24 Germany 4.88 1.63 Macedonia 2.79 2.29 Morocco 4.38 1.56 Sweden 7.98 1.88 Germany .080 
Italy 2.42 1.74 China 1.96 1.27 Portugal 4.83 1.66 Brazil 2.69 2.22 France 4.42 1.41 USA 7.98 2.08 France .079 
Mexico 2.42 1.95 Iran 1.85 1.25 China 4.69 1.73 Poland 2.44 2.12 UK 4.58 1.47 Portugal 8.42 1.66 Netherl. .079 
Morocco 2.41 2.04 Belgium 1.83 1.23 Mexico 4.58 1.96 Iran 2.42 2.06 Netherlands 4.61 1.49 Brazil 8.49 1.88 Mexico .077 
Netherlands 2.32 1.63 Mexico 1.75 1.56 Israel 4.52 1.91 China 2.17 1.48 Germany 4.63 1.63 China 8.49 1.71 Poland .076 
France 2.30 1.65 Poland 1.73 1.34 Poland 4.46 1.82 UK 2.16 1.59 Israel 4.64 1.49 Poland 8.54 1.88 Brazil .072 
Turkey 2.28 1.79 Netherlands 1.70 1.19 Brazil 4.30 1.72 France 2.13 1.67 USA 4.72 1.56 Australia 8.62 1.47 Italy .061 
Sweden 2.26 1.72 Venezuela 1.69 1.16 UK 4.24 1.56 Netherlands 2.05 1.75 Belgium 4.76 1.51 Venezuela 8.65 1.72 UK .046 
Macedonia 2.24 1.62 Sweden 1.52 1.00 Italy 4.19 1.77 Belgium 2.01 1.60 Canada 4.83 1.41 Italy 9.02 1.25 Australia .035 
Brazil 2.23 1.68 Germany 1.48 0.95 Sweden 4.17 1.81 Portugal 1.94 1.68 Portugal 4.86 1.50 Mexico 9.04 1.56 Canada .026 
Canada 2.06 1.72 USA 1.46 1.05 Belgium 4.13 1.69 Germany 1.92 1.67 Poland 4.90 1.53 Egypt 9.20 1.54 USA --- 
Egypt 2.06 1.65 Portugal 1.41 0.87 Iran 3.93 1.69 Canada 1.69 1.53 Australia 4.97 1.35 Tunisia 9.22 1.46 Belgium n/a 
Israel 2.06 1.59 Brazil 1.33 0.76 Netherlands 3.78 1.71 USA 1.69 1.59 Sweden 5.00 1.57 Macedonia 9.23 1.44 Israel n/a 
USA 1.91 1.67 Italy 1.33 0.78 Australia 3.57 1.58 Italy 1.62 1.39 Italy 5.11 1.41 Morocco 9.27 1.41 Maced. n/a 
Portugal 1.70 1.45 Australia 1.31 0.82 USA 3.48 1.69 Sweden 1.62 1.36 Macedonia 5.12 1.52 Israel 9.29 1.23 Portugal n/a 
Australia 1.67 1.24 Canada 1.27 0.76 Canada 3.38 1.79 Australia 1.50 1.26 Turkey 5.41 1.49 Turkey 9.65 1.05 Venezuela n/a 
Note. All scores range from 1-7, except science support (1-10). Science skepticism scores are presented in descending order from high to low. Faith in science and Science support scores are 
presented in ascending order from low to high. Dotted lines indicate cut-off based on mean totals, so that the countries above the line are more skeptical (and indicate lower faith in science and 
science support) than the total average. CFST US = Cultural distance to the United States (from Muthukrishna et al., 2020, Table 1.), ranked by distance: higher values indicate more distance. 
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Figure 1. Science skepticism and faith in science across countries. [PLEASE INSERT 
Worldmaps.ppsx BELOW] 
 
Note. Maps created on paintmaps.com. Color coding based on <25% mean scores (green); 25%-50% mean 
scores (yellow); 50%-75% mean scores (orange), >75% mean scores (red).  
 
Multilevel models 
For each dependent variable, we fit an empty multilevel model with country as the 
cluster variable and the same set of group-mean-centered predictor variables (measured at the 
individual level).  This allowed us to test whether there was significant variation in each 
dependent variable across countries that should be accounted for. In each case, the intra-class 
correlations (ICCs) and country-level variance estimates indicated that multilevel modelling was 
necessary and justified (see Table S1). We therefore present all estimates for within-level 
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coefficients after adjusting for between-level variation in each dependent variable. Table 3 
displays the results of these analyses across countries. Note that China was excluded from the 
multilevel analyses because one of the predictor variables (spirituality) was not included in the 
study conducted in China.  
In addition to the multilevel models, we also (a) zoom in at the hypothesized effects for 
each of the 24 countries (presented in Figures 2-6)vi, and (b) present the cross-level interaction 
analyses that test differences between WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries (using cultural 
distance from the US as a continuous proxy of WEIRDness24).  
Tests of hypothesized effects 
Climate change skepticism. As shown in Table 3, results supported the prediction that 
political conservatism would predict climate change skepticism (H1), (t = 4.58, p <.001). Figure 2 
shows that also as predicted, this effect was arithmetically the strongest in the USA (and 
Canada), supporting H1a. 
Vaccine skepticism.  As shown in Table 3, our main hypotheses for vaccine skepticism 
(H2) received mixed support: it was predicted by spirituality, t = 4.61, p <.001, but not religious 
orthodoxy, t = 1.51, p = .13.  The further hypothesis (H2a) that the relationship between 
spirituality and vaccine skepticism would be stronger in WEIRD countries was not supported: 
the predicted cross-level interaction of spirituality and cultural distance from the US was non-
significant, b = .390, se = .242, p = .108. Similarly, the hypothesis (H2b) that the relationship 
between religious orthodoxy and vaccine skepticism would be stronger in WEIRD countries did 
not receive support, b = .174, se = .286, p = .543.  Consistent with these nonsignificant cross-
level interactions, predicted associations for each country are presented in Figures 3a 
(spirituality) and 3b (religious orthodoxy), and reveal no consistent distinction between WEIRD 
 
vi Note that all effect sizes depicted in Figures 3-7 were calculated while controlling for all other predictors in the 
regression analyses. These effect sizes were rounded to 2 decimal places, which might result in very small 
deviations in overall RE model estimates displayed in the forest plots as compared to the estimates reported in 
Table 3. 
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and non-WEIRD nations. Finally, the hypothesis that vaccine skepticism would be negatively 
predicted by scientific literacy (H3) was supported, t = -5.96, p <.001.  
GM skepticism. Our main prediction that scientific literacy would predict GM skepticism 
(H4) was supported. As displayed in Table 3, scientific literacy was a significant negative 
predictor of skepticism, t = -8.12, p <.001. Figure 4 presents the strength of the predicted 
relationships per country, which was significant in 17 of the included countriesvii. 
Evolution skepticism. As can be seen in Table 3, H5—religious orthodoxy predicts 
evolution skepticism—was supported, t = 8.66, p <.001.  Figure 5 shows the strength of the 
relationship between religious orthodoxy and evolution skepticism per country, which was 
significant in almost all (20) countries.  
Faith in science. As shown in Table 3, the prediction (H6) that faith in science would be 
negatively predicted by spirituality, t = -13.90, p <.001, and religious orthodoxy, t = -7.59, p 
<.001, received clear support. Moreover, cross-level interaction analyses supported the 
hypothesis (H6a) that the negative relation between spirituality and faith in science would be 
stronger in WEIRD countries (slope: b = -.251, se = .013, p < .001), than in non-WEIRD countries 
(slope: b = -.187, se = .029, p < .001); the interaction effect between spirituality and cultural 
distance from the US was significant, b = .586, se = .280, p = .036. As shown in Figure 6a, the 
negative relation between spirituality and faith in science was significant in 20 countries; all 
except Egypt, Morocco, and Venezuelaviii. In stark contrast to these results, significant effects of 
 
vii As can be gleaned from Figure 4, the effect sizes are quite consistent with a few countries that stand out. Israel 
stands out by a positive association so that more scientific literacy leads to more GM skepticism, which suggests a 
polarization effect which has previously been observed for climate change skepticism6. The regression results 
showed that none of the additional variables contributed to GM skepticism in the Israeli sample, except for a very 
small effect of religiosity (t = -2.07, p = .04). In the French and Romanian samples, no relation with scientific 
literacy was observed; interestingly these are also the two countries with the highest levels of GM skepticism. 
Additional analyses show that in France the regression model performed poorly; none of the included variables 
contributes significantly to GM skepticism. In Romania, the regression model performed poorly as well with age 
being the only significant predictor, t = 4.13, p <.001. 
viii Note that spirituality was not measured in China. In Egypt, the regression model performed well (25% explained 
variance), with age, religious orthodoxy, and perceived corporate corruption being significant contributors to low 
faith in science. In Morocco, scientific literacy and perceived corporate corruption were significant contributors in 
a regression model that explained 17% variance. In Venezuela, the model performed poorly (3.5% variance 
explained), with religious orthodoxy as the only predictor that approached significance (t = -.19, p = .058). 
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religious orthodoxy were observed in 9 countries (see Figure 6b). Indeed, the prediction that 
religious orthodoxy would have a stronger effect in non-WEIRD nations (H6b) was not 
supported: the cross-level interaction was not significant, b = .014, se = .121, p = .908.  
 
Table 3 





GM skepticism Evolution 
skepticism 
Faith in science  Science support 
 Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Within level 
Age .006 (.002)* .003 (.002) .010 (.003)** .003 (.002) .003 (.002) .005 (.002)* 
Gender  .060 (.066) -.061 (.040) .340 (.049)** .100 (.062) -.227 (.027)** .065 (.046) 
Moral purity -.005 (.025) .084 (.019)** .167 (.029)** .169 (.025)** -.097 (.027)** -.022 (.029) 
Political conservatism .139 (.030)** .046 (.013)** -.041 (.016) .060 (.014)** -.054 (.015)** -.054 (.026) 
Spirituality -.011 (.017) .066 (.014)** .043 (.017) -.028 (.017) -.232 (.017)** .031 (.014) 
Religiosity@ -.004 (.086) .093 (.050) .103 (.072) -.375 (097)** .458 (.059)** -.143 (.071) 
Religious orthodoxy .031 (.027) .023 (.015) .049 (.025) .356 (.041)** -.136 (.018)** -.050 (.024) 
Science literacy -.044 (.025) -.111 (.019)** -.203 (.025)** -.140 (.024)** .061 (.024)^ .056 (.019)* 
Faith in science -.139 (.018)** -.095 (.013)** -.226 (.025)** -.259 (.021)** - .365 (.029)** 
Gov.corruption .098 (.026)** .038 (.012)* -.014 (.017) .001 (.014) .043 (.011)** -.047 (.030) 
Corp.corruption -.084 (.023)** .045 (.015)* .132 (.024)** -.001 (.020) -.083 (.009)** .084 (.024)** 
Note. * p <.01; ** p <.001. China not included. Estimates are unstandardized. @Note that religiosity was 
scored as 1=yes; 2=no, and so a negative estimate indicates a positive relation with religiosity.  
 
Science skepticism across 24 countries 
14 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between political conservatism and climate change skepticism across 24 
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Figure 3a. Relationship between spirituality and vaccine skepticism across 23 countries 
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Figure 3b. Relationship between religious orthodoxy and vaccine skepticism across 24 countries 
(controlling for age, gender, faith in science, and for the other predictors) 
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Figure 3c. Relationship between scientific literacy and vaccine skepticism across 24 countries 
(controlling for age, gender, faith in science, and for the other predictors). 
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Figure 4. Relationship between scientific literacy and GM skepticism across 24 countries 
(controlling for age, gender, faith in science, and for the other predictors). 
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Figure 5. Relationship between religious orthodoxy and evolution skepticism across 24 
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Figure 6a. Relationship between spirituality and faith in science across 23 countries (controlling 
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Figure 6b. Relationship between religious orthodoxy and faith in science across 24 countries 
(controlling for age, gender, and for the other predictors). 
 
Other notable results 
Science support. As displayed in Table 3, willingness to support science was best 
predicted by faith in science (t = 12.65, p <.001), which corroborates previous work.1-2.  
Other contributors to science skepticism. As can be seen in Table 3, some additional 
relations were observed. Most notably and consistently, faith in science—which was included 
as a predictorix in the analyses predicting domain-specific science skepticism—contributed 
 
ix Since controlling for faith in science might be overly conservative, we reran all analyses on domain-specific 
skepticism without controlling for faith in science. This did not meaningfully change the outcomes of any of the 
multilevel models, nor did it affect the reported cross-level interaction effects for vaccine skepticism.  
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substantially to the explained variance for all four domains of skepticism, in line with previous 
research1-2.  
Discussion 
The extent to which science skepticism varies in degree and in kind around the world is not well 
understood. Up to now, a systematic cross-national investigation of the relative impact of 
various potential predictors of science skepticism across domains was lacking. This lacuna has 
obstructed efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science - a phenomenon that is 
causing catastrophic health, economic, and environmental harms4,25. The current paper reports 
the results of the first large-scale effort to address this lacuna. In so doing, this work provides 
clear support for the heterogeneity of science skepticism, both in degree (levels of skepticism 
vary across domains but also across countries) and in kind (different predictors drive science 
skepticism in different domains). As formalized in our main hypotheses (H1 to H6), we expected 
different predictors to drive skepticism in different domains, within and across nations. All main 
hypotheses were supported, except for H2 (we did not find evidence that religious orthodoxy 
uniquely contributes to vaccine skepticism). We had also expected some heterogeneity to 
manifest between nations, such that WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations would show systematic 
variation in patterns of science skepticism. These predictions were formalized in the country-
level hypotheses (H1a, H2a-b, and H6a-b). It was indeed found that the impact of political 
conservatism on climate change skepticism was strongest in the USA (H1a) but note that it was 
equally strong in Canada (followed by other WEIRD nations; Australia and The Netherlands). 
Evidence for the hypotheses that vaccine skepticism and low faith in science would be best 
predicted by spirituality in WEIRD nations (H2a-H6a) and by orthodoxy in non-WEIRD nations 
(H2b-H6a) was found for faith in science but not for vaccine skepticism. Taken together, the 
results show that, of the various beliefs and ideologies examined as predictors of science 
skepticism, spirituality is among the most important. 
Indeed, confirming previous results obtained in the Netherlands2—and providing strong 
support for Hypothesis 6—the current data speak to the crucial role of spirituality in fostering 
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low faith in science, more generally, beyond its domain-specific effects on vaccine skepticism. 
This indicates that the negative impact of spirituality on faith in science represents a cross-
national phenomenon that is more generalizable than might be expected based on the large 
variety24 of countries included here. A possible explanation for the robustness of this effect may 
lie in the inherent irreconcilability of the intuitive epistemology of a spiritual belief system with 
science2. (If so, then we might look at a potentially much larger problem that extends beyond 
spirituality and applies more generally to “post-truth” society, in which truth and perceptions of 
reality may be based on feelings rather than facts28,29).  However, these results do not mean 
that traditional religiosity as a predictor of science skepticism1,5,11 has now become irrelevant: 
Not only did religious orthodoxy significantly contribute to low faith in science, it was also 
found to be a very consistent cross-national predictor of evolution skepticism (but not of other 
forms of science skepticism included in the study). 
Research has started to challenge the widespread notion that science skepticism 
primarily results from a lack of knowledgex. In the current work, scientific literacy was the main 
driver of science skepticism only in the domain of GM. This corroborates previous research and 
observations that suggest that merely addressing information deficits to combat science 
skepticism is in most cases not sufficient2,5,12.   
The cross-national approach of the current work is important because it provides 
support for the emerging theoretical understanding of what causes skepticism across different 
domains of science2,5,9-12, and does so by including various countries that have been virtually 
absent from the psychological science database8,24,30. The present results demonstrate that 
while predictors of science skepticism to some extent vary in predictable ways between 
countries, many of the hypothesized effects were observed across many of the included 
countries. Levels of skepticism showed more regional variation. This heterogeneity of science 
skepticism in degree is illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1, with some countries standing out as 
being especially high or low on skepticism. For example, in Egypt, Romania, and Venezuela, 
science skepticism is much stronger than in Australia or Canada. Additionally, remarkable 
 
x See a recent review article that details some of that work5  
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differences in science skepticism were observed within countries, depending on the domain 
(e.g., GM skepticism versus skepticism in other domains in France, general faith in science 
versus domain-specific skepticism in Turkey). 
One obvious and important limitation to the current work concerns the limited nature 
of the measures used. Many of the key measures employed were self-report single-item (i.e., 
most outcome variables) or two-item indices (i.e., most of the predictor variables). The brevity 
of the materials was necessary in order to keep study length constrained. Thus, the construct 
validity and (cross-cultural) reliability of these measures are necessarily limited, and we hope 
that future research will replicate and extend (some of) these results with better measures and 
extensive equivalence testing. That being said, the current measures have been used frequently 
in previous work; the single-item outcome measures have been shown to produce similar 
results as multi-item variants1-2, and the spirituality and religious orthodoxy indices consist of 
the items with the highest factor loadings1-2. 
In conclusion, the present results can support the further development of our 
understanding of the various causes of science skepticism in different domains and in different 
cultures and countries, which in turn may help support interventions and communication 
strategies. Indeed, these results may be particularly informative when the aim is to understand 
how trust in science and compliance with its recommendations vary across individuals and 
countries, for example during a global pandemic like Covid-19. To illustrate, let us return to the 
more general problem of vaccine hesitancy as an example of how skepticism can pose serious 
risks to public health. The current results suggest that increasing scientific literacy might prove 
to be a more fruitful approach in some cultural contexts than in others (see Figure 3-c). In 
contrast, a better understanding of the relation between spiritual beliefs and general science 
skepticism is likely to be extremely informative regardless of cultural context. Regardless, it is 
evident that any strategy aimed at combating science skepticism needs to be underpinned by a 
nuanced theoretical and empirical understanding of its causes, across domains as well as 
cultural contexts.  
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